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ABSTRACT
This paper combines a model of parental school choice with randomized school lotteries in order to
understand the effects of being assigned to a first-choice school on academic outcomes. We outline
a simple framework in which those who place the highest weight on academics when choosing a school
benefit the most academically when admitted. Although the average student does not improve academically
when winning a school lottery, this average impact conceals a range of impacts for identifiable subgroups
of students. Children of parents whose choices revealed a strong preference for academic quality experienced
significant gains in test scores as a result of attending their chosen school, while children whose parents
weighted academic characteristics less heavily experienced academic losses. This differential effect
is largest for children of parents who forfeit the most in terms of utility gains from proximity and racial
match to choose a school with stronger academics. Depending on one's own race and neighborhood,
a preference for academic quality can either conflict with or be reinforced by other objectives, such
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Public school choice plans are intended to improve academic achievement, by 
allowing parents to choose a school other than their neighborhood school and by giving 
local schools an incentive to attract and retain students. Many urban public school 
districts are experimenting with some form of school choice. In fact, the federal No Child 
Left Behind Act (NCLB) requires that school districts give students at persistently under-
performing public schools the option to choose a higher-achieving public school. 
Nevertheless, there is little empirical evidence that offering disadvantaged students more 
choices will lead to any substantial increase in academic achievement.  
A number of papers have used random assignment to estimate the effect on 
academic outcomes of attending a school other than the local public school. Most of these 
papers identify the average treatment effect using lottery assignment to over-subscribed 
public schools or the randomization of private school vouchers (Witte et al. (1995), 
Greene et al. (1997), Rouse (1998), Peterson et al. (1998), Mayer et al. (2002), Krueger 
and Zhu (2004), Cullen et al. (2006), Hastings et al. (2006b)).
1 Taken together, these 
papers fail to find robust impacts on average academic outcomes. 
  However, as noted in many of these papers, parents may have a variety of reasons 
for choosing schools, and we might expect this to lead to heterogeneous impacts of 
attending a first choice school on academic achievement (Heckman et al. (1997), 
Heckman (1997), Heckman,  et al. (2006)). The child of an academically oriented parent 
who chooses to send her child across town to attend a high-performing school may 
experience larger gains from school choice than the child of a parent who chooses a 
school primarily for convenience – particularly when the most convenient school is low 
performing. Thus, the average effect of attending a first choice school may be zero even 
if schools do have offsetting positive and negative impacts for subsets of children.  
                                                 
1 An earlier non-experimental literature compared academic outcomes of those students who chose to 
attend private, charter or magnet schools to those students who remained in their neighborhood school 
(Coleman et al. (1982), Bryk et al. (1993), Blank (1983), Gamoran (1996), Evans and Schwab (1995), Neal 
(1997), Altonji et al. (2002)).     4
In this paper we use the choice rankings of parents following the introduction of 
district-wide school choice in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District (CMS) along 
with lottery assignment of students to first choice schools to shed light on the factors that 
drive parental choice and their relationship to subsequent student outcomes. In 2002, 
CMS introduced a district-wide choice plan to end three decades of busing for 
integration. All parents in the district were asked to provide their top three school choices 
and a lottery was used to determine admission to oversubscribed schools. We show that 
parents’ choices were very heterogeneous, and outline a simple model that illustrates how 
the academic gains from attending a first-choice school should be positive for parents 
who place a high implicit weight on academics when choosing a school, and potentially 
negative for parents who place low weights on academics and high weights on other 
factors that are negatively correlated with academics (e.g. geographic proximity or 
fraction minority). We then use the rich choice data and lottery assignment to test this 
model in the data, explicitly allowing for heterogeneity in treatment effects generated by 
the underlying preferences that drove parents’ school choices. 
In order to estimate the implicit weight each parent placed on academics when 
choosing a school, we first estimate the distribution of preferences for school 
characteristics using a mixed logit model (McFadden and Train (2000),Train (2003)).
2 
This random utility model allows parents to have heterogeneous preferences for school 
characteristics that depend on observable demographics as well as idiosyncratic factors. 
The estimates from this model can be used to calculate a posterior estimate of the implicit 
weight that each parent placed on academics when choosing a school.
3 This implicit 
weight is effectively a non-linear index of baseline characteristics, combining all of the 
information about the student, their proximity to each school, the characteristics of each 
school and the schools their parents selected into a single summary statistic. It measures 
how unexpected a parent’s choices were relative to what a typical parent would have 
chosen given their demographics and geographic location. For example, if a parent 
chooses schools with high test scores in each of their three choices, passing over closer 
                                                 
2 For a more complete discussion of the effect of school characteristics in determining parental demand, see 
Hastings et al. (2006a).   
3 Because of the availability in our data of multiple ranked choices for each parent, we are able to identify 
idiosyncratic heterogeneity in preferences based on systematic differences in the sequential choices made 
by parents of similar students facing similar school options (Berry et al. (2004)).   5
schools that most other parents would have preferred, we would infer that they place a 
high implicit weight on academics.  
We then turn to the lottery assignments to investigate if students experience 
academic gains from attending a first-choice school. Consistent with the prior literature, 
we find no average gain in test scores from attending a first choice school. We do, 
however, find significant positive gains among white students and students of higher-
income families, and negative but insignificant impacts for African Americans and 
children of lower-income families. We show that this pattern of subgroup differences in 
gains is consistent with differences in underlying preferences and the trade-offs parents 
face. We do this in two ways. First, we show that the average weight placed on 
academics is positively correlated with the average treatment effect across subgroups 
(although the differences in subgroup impacts are too imprecisely estimated to be 
statistically distinguishable). Second we allow the treatment effect of attending a first 
choice school to vary explicitly with the implicit weight that parents place on academics. 
We find that the treatment effect varies significantly and positively with this weight. 
Students with estimated weights on school test scores at the 95
th percentile experienced 
significant rises in End of Grade test scores of approximately 0.1 standard deviations. 
These students are most likely to be white and have higher income levels, thus generating 
the significant subgroup impacts by race and income. In contrast, students placing little 
value on academics actually experienced declines in academic achievement. We show 
that this is strongest for African Americans, who must trade-off academic gains against 
utility gains from attending a school with a high proportion of minority students.  
This paper offers a model and an approach that explains and gives an economic 
interpretation to heterogeneous treatment effects across subgroups of students. Prior 
research has speculated that differing preferences may contribute to the observed 
differences in impacts across subgroups, but has not had a setting in which to both 
estimate the underlying determinants of school choice and the resulting outcomes from 
attending a first choice school. Our results suggest that differing impacts across 
subgroups can be largely explained by underlying differences in parents’ willingness to 
trade off expected gains in academic achievement for gains in utility along other 
dimensions, such as proximity or school racial composition. More generally, this implies   6
that the impact of school choice on academic outcomes will depend on both the 
willingness of parents to make these tradeoffs, and the extent to which the available 
school choices require such tradeoffs to be made.  
This paper proceeds in five main sections. The first section lays the background 
for the data and estimation by describing key details of the CMS school choice plan. The 
second section outlines the relationship between expected academic outcomes and 
preferences in a school choice plan, where parents choose schools based on expected 
academic achievement and other school characteristics, and students are then granted 
admission to schools by lottery. In the third section, we generate estimates of the 
preferences for academic achievement. We incorporate these preference estimates into 
our final estimation of the effect of attending a first choice school on academic outcomes. 
The final section concludes.  
  
II.  Background: The CMS School Choice Plan 
  
Before the introduction of a school choice plan in the fall of 2002, the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg public school district (CMS) operated under a racial desegregation order for 
three decades. In September 2001, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declared the 
school district “unitary” and ordered the district to dismantle the race-based student 
assignment plan by the beginning of the next school year. In December of 2001, the 
school board voted to approve a new district-wide public school choice plan. 
   In the spring of 2002, parents were asked to submit their top three choices of 
school programs for each child. Each student was assigned a “home school” in their 
neighborhood, often the closest school to them, and was guaranteed a seat at this school. 
Magnet students were similarly guaranteed admission to continue in their current magnet 
programs. Admission for all other students was limited by grade-specific capacity limits 
set by the district. Students could choose any school in the district. However, 
transportation was only guaranteed to schools in a student’s quadrant of the district (the 
district was split into 4 quadrants called ‘choice zones’). The district allowed significant 
increases in enrollment in many schools in the first year of the school choice program in 
an expressed effort to give each child one of their top three choices. In the spring of 2002,   7
the district received choice applications for approximately 105,000 of 110,000 students. 
Admission to over-subscribed schools was determined by a lottery system as described 
below.  
Once the district was declared “unitary” and the court order requiring race-based 
busing was terminated, they could no longer draw boundaries based on the racial 
composition of a neighborhood. As a result, the former school assignment zones, which 
often paired non-contiguous black and white neighborhoods, were dramatically redrawn. 
Under the choice plan, 43 percent of parcels were assigned to a different elementary 
grade ‘home school’ than they were assigned to the year before under the busing system. 
At the middle school and high school levels this number was 52 and 35 percent 
respectively. Therefore, the 2002-2003 home school for many students is often not the 
school they would have been assigned at the time they chose their residence. This 
dramatic change in school assignment zones, the simultaneous introduction of a sweeping 
school choice plan, and the assignment of students to high-demand schools by lottery 
provides a unique opportunity to estimate parental preferences for schools and model the 
heterogeneous impact of attending a chosen school on academic outcomes. 
 
Lottery Assignments 
  Approximately one third of the schools in the district were oversubscribed. The 
district implemented a lottery system for determining enrollments in those oversubscribed 
schools. Under the lottery system, students choosing non-home schools were first 
assigned to priority groups and student admission was then determined by a lottery 
number. The priority groups for district schools were arranged in lexicographic order 
based on the following priorities: 
 
Priority  1:  Student who had attended the school in the prior year. (Students were 
subdivided into 3 priority groups depending upon their grade level, with 
students in terminal grades—grades 5, 8 and 12—given highest priority.) 
Priority 2:  Free-lunch eligible student applying to school where less than half the 
students were free-lunch eligible. 
Priority 3:  Student applying to a school within their choice zone.   8
 
Students listing a given school as their first choice were sorted by priority group 
and a randomly assigned lottery number.
4 Any slots remaining after home school students 
were accommodated were assigned in order of priority group and random number.
5 If a 
school was not filled by those who had listed it as a first choice, the lottery would repeat 
the process with those listing the school as a second choice, using the same priority 
groups as above. However, for many oversubscribed schools, the available spaces were 
filled up by the time the second choice priority groups came up. 
Students who were not assigned one of their top choices were placed on a waiting 
list. About 19% of students winning the lottery to attend their first choice schools 
subsequently attended a different school, with 13% choosing to attend their home school 
instead and another 6% choosing to attend a different school entirely, with most of these 
students changing address. When slots became available, students were taken off the wait 
list based on their lottery number alone, without regard for their priority group. 
 
Potential for Strategic Choice 
The lottery mechanism used by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools was a ‘first-
choice-maximizer,’ in which slots were first assigned to all those listing a given school as 
a first choice before moving to those listing the school as a second or third choice. In 
such a mechanism, parents with poor home school options may have an incentive to 
misstate their preferences – not listing their most preferred school if it had a low 
probability of admission (Glazerman and Meyer (1994), Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez 
(2003), Abdulkadiroglu et. al (2006)). Instead, they may have hedged their bets by listing 
a less preferred option with a higher probability of admission in order to avoid being 
assigned to their home school. Such strategic behavior would imply that student choices 
would not reflect true preference orderings for schools—to the extent that students are 
not listing their preferred match due to strategic hedging on quality.  
                                                 
4 The random number was assigned by a computer using an algorithm that we verified with CMS computer 
programmers.   
5 Once any sibling was admitted to a school, other siblings could choose to attend the school.  We dropped 
those who were admitted to a school because of a sibling preference. 
   9
However, there were a number of reasons why such strategic behavior was 
probably rare in the first year of the choice plan that we are studying. First, parents did 
not know the details of how the lottery system would be operated. The handful of district 
officials who knew the lottery details were not allowed to communicate them to parents. 
Parents were never given their actual lottery numbers. The district also told parents that 
they would make every attempt to give each student admission to one of their chosen 
schools, and instructed them to list what they wanted. In order to accommodate demand, 
the district substantially expanded capacity at popular schools. In addition, the district 
gave a ‘priority boost’ to low-income students choosing to attend schools with low 
concentrations of low income students. Hence, choices for top schools by students with 
under-performing home schools would be given top priority. This would counteract the 
incentive for these students to hedge their choices as outlined above.  
If there were widespread strategic behavior by parents, we would expect those 
with low-quality default schools to hedge their bets and list less desirable schools for 
which they might have a higher probability of admission. In another paper, Hastings et al. 
(2006a), we test whether parents with exogenous changes in the quality of their default 
school produced by the redistricting had lower preferences for high-quality schools as 
would be predicted if parents were behaving strategically. Perhaps because of the 
uncertainty about the mechanism and the newness of the system, we did not find 




III.  Preferences, Choices and Expected Treatment Effects 
 
We have access to administrative data for all students in CMS for the year before 
and after the implementation of school choice. Throughout the analysis, we focus on 
students entering grades 4 through 8 since we have baseline test scores for this group of 
students for North Carolina End of Grade Tests. For each student, we have the choice 
forms submitted to CMS, allowing a parent to specify up to three choices for their child’s 
school. In addition to the student choices, our data contain student characteristics for the 
                                                 
6 For the details of this test, as well as for further specification checks on the mixed logit demand 
estimation, please see Hastings et al. (2006a), Section VIII, pp. 21-27.   10
years before and after school choice, including geo-coded residential location, race, 
gender, lunch-subsidy recipient status, and student test scores for standardized North 
Carolina End of Grade exams in math and reading, and school assignment. The data also 
include student-level lottery numbers, lottery outcomes and school assignments for the 
2002-2003 school choice lottery.  
It is clear that parents have very heterogeneous preferences over school 
characteristics. As reported in Figure 1, approximately 20% of students chose schools 
that had lower test scores than the school they had guaranteed admission to. In addition, 
among those with the same elementary home school for 2002-03, parents on average 
listed 10 different elementary schools as their first choice.
7 The range of choices made 
suggests that heterogeneous preferences may play a key role in school selection, and may 
therefore generate differential gains in academic achievement. 
A simple model illustrates how the expected gains in academic achievement will 
depend on parental preferences. Suppose that parents choose schools for both the 
expected academic gain for their child, but also for other reasons, such as proximity or 
racial composition. Consider the following utility function of parent i for school j  
(1)  ij ij
A
i ij V A U + = β  
where  ij A  is the expected academic achievement of student i if she attends school j,  ij V  is 
the utility for student i from attending school j along non-academic dimensions, and
A
i β is 
the weight that parent i places on academic achievement relative to non-academic 
dimensions. The utility gain from attending the first choice over the alternative school is: 
(2)  V A U
A
i Δ + Δ = Δ β  
where delta denotes the difference in variables between school alternatives k and j. A 
student will choose an alternative school over their home school only if the utility gain is 
positive, i.e.  0 > ΔU . Among students choosing an alternative school over their home 
                                                 
7 This statistic excludes heterogeneity in choices generated solely by heterogeneity in prior-year school 
assignment under the bussing system. If we include choices driven by preferences for prior-year schools by 
students with different prior-year schools under bussing, but the same new home-school assignment area 
under choice, this statistic increases to 14.6.    11
school, the expected academic gain of a student randomized into their 1
st choice school is 
given by:
8 
(3)  ) 0 | ( > Δ + Δ Δ V A A E
A
i β  
In this simple framework, students with high 
A
i β  have a positive expected 
treatment effect (gain in academic achievement from attending the first-choice school). In 
fact, as 
A
i β  gets very large, the expected treatment effect alone determines choice and, 
therefore, must be positive for all students who choose an alternative school. For a 
student with low
A
i β  (near zero), the expected treatment effect is ambiguous. If  A Δ  and 
V Δ  are independent and  A Δ  is mean zero, then the expected treatment effect is zero, i.e. 
0 ) 0 | ( = > Δ Δ V A E . If  A Δ  is negatively correlated with  V Δ - as may be the case for 
some non-academic dimensions such as proximity and percent African American - then 
the treatment effect will be negative for students, unless their parents’ preference for 
academic quality is sufficiently strong to overcome the negative trade-off. That is, the 
parent of a student in a neighborhood served by a low-performing school or the parent of 
a minority student who wants her child to attend a school with same-race peers may give 
up gains in her child’s academic achievement if her preference for academics is not large 
enough to counter-balance her preferences for non-academic factors. Hence, this basic 
framework generates the prediction that the expected treatment effect is positive for all 
students with a strong preference for academic achievement. Among students with 
weaker preferences for academic achievement, the expected treatment effect will depend 
on the tradeoffs that parents face. The treatment effect could even be negative if expected 
academic achievement is sufficiently negatively correlated with other valued school 
characteristics.  
 
Estimating Preferences Using a Random Utility Model 
Accordingly, we use parents’ school choices to infer preferences for academic 
achievement and then use them to test if differences in underlying preferences and the 
trade-offs parents face affect the impact that attending a first choice school has on a 
                                                 
8 As noted earlier, the lottery was run as a ‘first-choice maximizer’. Because of this, most students who did 
not win the lottery for their parents’ first choice school were assigned to their home school.   12
student’s academic achievement. Let Uij be the expected utility of individual i from 
attending school j. Suppose that utility is a linear function of the academic achievement 
of student i at school j, ij A , and other school-student characteristics, ij Z , such as distance 
from home, busing availability, and racial composition. Thus, expected utility is given 
by:  
(4)  ij ij i ij
A
i ij Z A U ω γ β + + =  
where
A
i β and i γ  represent preference parameters for person i, and  ij ω  represents an 
unobserved idiosyncratic preference of student i for school j.  
Furthermore, suppose that the expected academic achievement for student i 
attending school j depends on the average test score at school j ( j S with a coefficient 
normalized to one), other observable characteristics of the school ( ij Z ), plus a mean zero 
deviation that is known to the parent ( ij υ ). 
(5)  ij ij j ij Z S A υ α + + =  
In this model, parents base their expectations of academic achievement on observable 
school characteristics plus idiosyncratic factors affecting their child.
9 This specification 
allows for the possibility that non-academic factors such as proximity may affect 
academic achievement (for example, through longer bus rides) and also allows for the 
possibility that parents adjust school test scores for racial composition of the school (the 
“value-added” approach). This adjustment can be different for parents with different 
observables (such as race) if preferences for school characteristics are allowed to vary 
with student observable characteristics.  
Using equation (5), we can re-write the indirect utility function as: 




i ij X Z S U ε β ε β β + = + + =  
                                                 
9 An alternative specification would further multiply the right hand side of (5) by an individual-specific 
coefficient, representing an individual-specific return to attending a more academically oriented school.  
This alternative specification results in an identical empirical specification of indirect utility  in (6), but 
with a different interpretation – a higher coefficient on school test score could represent either a stronger 
preference for academics or a higher return to academic achievement from attending an academically 
oriented school.   13
where  ij ij
A








i i β β β = . Assuming 
that the ij ε  are independently distributed extreme value, we get the typical logit functional 
form for the probability of choosing school j.
10 With distributional assumptions on the 
preference parameters, we have a mixed logit utility model. The mixed logit can 
approximate any random utility model, given appropriate mixing distributions and 
explanatory variables (Dagsvik (1994), McFadden and Train (2000)). 
Even though the expected academic achievement for student i attending school j 
( ij A ) is not observed directly, the weight placed on academic achievement can be 
estimated. The weight on academic achievement (
A
i β ) is identified in the mixed logit 
model because school test scores are assumed to influence utility only through their effect 
on academic achievement, whereas other school characteristics in ij Z  may affect utility 
directly as well as indirectly through expected academic achievement. Obtaining direct 
estimates of  ij A  would require additional structural assumptions to identify how 
academic achievement depends on observable school characteristics and idiosyncratic 
factors affecting a child’s academic performance at each school ( ij ij Z υ α + ).
11 Rather 
than impose additional assumptions, our analysis focuses on the more fundamental 
implication that parents placing a high weight on school test scores (high-
A
i β ) should be 
more likely to choose schools that increase their child’s academic achievement. While 
parents may prefer schools with high test scores for non-academic reasons as well (e.g., 
status or social connections), it is reasonable to assume academics are their primary 
concern. An important benefit of this approach is that we do not have to completely 
specify how school and student characteristics combine to produce academic 
                                                 
10 Note that estimation involves normalizing the variance of εij. Since Var(εij )is an increasing function of 
A
i β , normalization will reduce the estimate of 
A
i β  for high-
A
i β  types.  While this will act to understate 
the estimated variation in 
A
i β  in the final model, it does not affect the relative rankings of individuals with 
respect to 
A
i β  – which is the information we use to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. 
11  For example, if Aij = Xjβi + vij and Vij = Zijγi + ωij, with vij i.i.d. normal and ωij i.i.d. extreme value, and 
no common variables in X and Z, then one can estimate E(∆A|∆U>0) directly from the random utility 
model.  We estimated models of this form and found that they performed poorly in terms of predicting the 
magnitude of the treatment effect, suggesting that either our assumptions were too restrictive or the 
necessary student-choice level idiosyncratic parameters were poorly identified.   14
achievement: we just need to know that academic achievement was important to the 
parent in choosing a school.  
We estimate the underlying preference parameters in this random utility model 
using simulated maximum likelihood techniques (Train (2003)). The probability that 
individual i chooses schools (j
1,j
2, j
3) is given by: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) { }





















3 2 1 3 2 1
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We assume that () θ μ β β , | ~ f , where ( ) f ⋅ is a joint-normal mixing distribution, 
μ  denotes the mean, and θ represents the variance parameters. The term inside the 
integrand represents the probability of observing the three ranked choices conditional on 
the preference coefficients (β): this is the product of three logit probabilities evaluated 
at i β , corresponding to the probability of making each choice from among the remaining 
options.
12 This conditional probability is integrated over the distribution of β  to yield the 
unconditional probability of observing the ranked choices. Estimation was by the method 
of maximum simulated likelihood, using 100 draws of β  from  ( ) f ⋅  for each individual 
in the data set. The results were not sensitive to the number of draws used. We assume 
that all random parameters are drawn from a normal or log normal distribution, and allow 
for correlation among some of the main preference parameters as reported in the tables.  
The maximum likelihood results yield parameter estimates for the mean and 
variance of preferences in the population. We then use Bayes’ rule to calculate posterior 
estimates of the weight each student placed on school scores in the following way (Revelt 
and Train (1998), Train (2003)):  
() ( ) ( )
() θ μ
β θ μ β β β
θ μ β
, , |
, | , |







i X y P
d f X y P
X y E ∫ =  
Where yi denotes the choices the student made. This equation is the expected value of 
student i’s preference for academics given her characteristics, the choices she made, the 
                                                 
12 For students submitting fewer than three choices, the likelihood is modified in an obvious way to reflect 
only the probability of the submitted choices. 
(7) 
(8)   15
characteristics of the schools given her location, and the estimated distribution of 
preferences in the population. We calculate this posterior for each student in our 
randomized lottery admission group using 1000 draws from the estimated preference 
distributions in from the mixed logit demand estimation.
 13  
This posterior weight on average test scores is what we will use to examine if 
heterogeneous preferences drive choices and expected treatment effect. Notice that it will 
vary with demographics if we allow mean preferences to vary with observable family 
characteristics such as race, lunch status, family income, and student baseline score. 
However, the posterior weight also captures baseline information on how the choice of 
the parent differed from the choices of observationally similar parents facing the same 
choice set. Thus the posterior weight incorporates a large amount of information into one 
summary statistic in a way that would be difficult to capture with simple subgroups based 
on student demographics or characteristics of the chosen school.  
 
IV.   Demand Estimation Results 
We follow Hastings et al. (2006a) and present mixed logit results from that model 
here. The model includes key observable school characteristics: the distance from student 
i to school j (measured in miles along roads), an indicator if the student was eligible for 
busing to the school, and an indicator if the school was designated as the student’s 
neighborhood school, an indicator if the child attended the school in the prior year, the 
percent black in the school (in Spring 2003) and its square,  and a measure of average test 
scores in the school (the school level average of all students’ standardized math and 
reading scores in spring of 2003).
14 Table I lists the independent variables in the indirect 
utility function and describes how they were constructed.  
We allow the mean preference for academic achievement (the coefficient on 
school test scores) to vary linearly with the student’s standardized baseline test score 
(from the spring of the prior year, standardized by grade level across the district) and the 
                                                 
13 See Train (2003) p. 270 for Monte Carlo Simulations of the accuracy of individual-level parameter 
estimates and the number of observed choice situations.  
14 We use the average test scores at the end of the first year of choice instead of those at the end of the year 
before school choice was implemented. Hastings et al. (2006a) presents demand estimation results for 
various measures of school academic achievement. They find for example that value added measures do a 
poor job of explaining choices, and that the choice data imply that parents are choosing schools based on 
levels instead of changes in academic achievement.    16
median household income in the student’s neighborhood for the student’s race (measured 
in $1000’s, using their census block group in 2000, and de-meaned with the countywide 
median of $51,000). Preferences for distance are constrained to be negative with a log 
normal distribution. We allow preferences for proximity and academic quality to be 
correlated. All other preference distributions are assumed to be independently and 
normally distributed. We estimate the parameters of the preference distribution separately 
by race and lunch-subsidy status, thus allowing for full interactions with race and lunch 
status. 
As discussed in more detail in Hastings et al. (2006a), several aspects of the CMS 
school choice data and experiment are helpful for identifying preferences in our demand 
estimation. First, the large scale redistricting that occurred with the introduction of school 
choice helps to identify preference parameters separately from residential sorting. 
Without redistricting and the multiple-choice responses, residential sorting would 
potentially confound the preferences for proximity with preferences for other desired 
school attributes.
 15  
Second, historic placement of schools for busing in CMS provides wide variation 
in school characteristics for families in all socio-economic groups, dampening 
collinearity problems that may be present in other settings.
16 Third, approximately 95% 
of the 110,000 students submitted choices for the choice plan. Thus we have data for 
nearly the entire student population—whereas most work using school choice data has 
been dependent on limited and potentially non-representative subgroups of students. 
Fourth, the multiple responses create variation in the choice set by effectively 
removing the prior chosen school from the subsequent choice set. This choice-set 
variation allows us to estimate the distribution of preferences for school characteristics 
from observed substitution patterns for each individual – a stronger source of variation 
for identification than cross-sectional changes in the choice set based on geographic 
location (Train (2003), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004)). Intuitively, when only a 
                                                 
15 In addition, multiple choices listed by those selecting their home school first further separates preferences 
for school characteristics from residential sorting by simulating the unavailability of the neighborhood 
school. For a comparison of preference estimates for the redistricted sub-sample versus the full sample, 
please see Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2006a). They show that preferences are very similar for the 
redistricted subsample of students relative to the population.  
16 Hastings et al. (2006a) show that average distance to a top-tier school is the same across all socio-
economic groups.   17
single (1
st) choice is observed for every individual, it is difficult to be sure whether an 
unexpected choice was the result of an unusual error term ( ij ε ) or unusual preferences by 
the individual ( i β ) for some aspect of the choice. However, when an individual makes 
multiple choices that share a common attribute (e.g. high test scores) we can infer that the 
individual has a strong preference for that attribute, because independence of the additive 
error terms across choices would make observing such an event very unlikely in the 
absence of a strong preference.  
The final estimation sample includes 36,816 students entering grades 4-8. 
Estimation is limited to these grades because of the lack of test scores (either baseline or 
school test scores) in other grades. The means and standard deviations of these variables 
across the 2.4 million school, student, and choice rank interactions available to our 
sample of students and schools are reported in Table II. Table III presents the results from 
the mixed logit demand estimation by race and lunch-recipient status. All of the point 
estimates were precisely estimated and statistically different from zero at less than the 1 
percent level. We report the estimates for the means, standard deviations, and correlation 
coefficients (where appropriate) for the preference distributions. The discussion of results 
is focused around the parameters most relevant for our final estimation of the effect of 
attending a first choice school on academic achievement. For a further discussion of the 
results and their implications for student sorting and competition on quality in public 
school choice, please see Hastings et al. (2006a).  
The first four rows of coefficients in Table III report the preferences for school 
test scores by race and lunch-recipient status. The first row of coefficients reports the 
mean preference for school scores for the average student. It is positive for all four 
demographic groups, implying that school test scores have a positive effect on choosing a 
school for the average student.  For a student with average baseline test scores and 
average income, the mean preference for school scores is larger for non-white students 
(1.80) than for white students (1.17) among students not receiving lunch subsidies. These 
coefficients imply that a 0.1 increase in average test scores at a school (one tenth of a 
student-level standard deviation) is associated with a 10%-20% increase in the odds of 
choosing that school for an average student not receiving lunch subsidies. Preference for   18
school scores among students receiving lunch subsidies are lower for both whites and 
nonwhites, but the difference between whites and nonwhites is similar.  
We also allow the mean preference for school test scores to vary with the 
student’s baseline test score and their neighborhood income level.
17 The third and fourth 
rows of parameter estimates report the coefficient on the interaction of school scores with 
income and the student’s baseline score respectively.
18 The coefficients on the income 
interaction imply that mean preferences for a school’s test score (conditional on its racial 
composition) are increasing with income. The magnitudes of these parameters are 
roughly consistent with the differences in the mean preferences for test scores between 
lunch-recipients and non-lunch recipients within race. Similarly, the mean preference for 
school scores is increasing in the student’s baseline test score. The coefficient on the 
interaction between the student’s baseline test score and the school mean test score is 
positive - implying that those with higher test scores relative to their baseline peer group 
value a school’s test scores more. The effect of a student’s baseline score on the 
preference for school test scores is similar in magnitude to the effect of income. A one 
standard deviation increase in the baseline test score is associated with a 0.3-0.6 increase 
in the mean preference for school test scores, while a one standard deviation increase in 
neighborhood income (about $25,000) is associated with a 0.3-0.4 increase in the mean 
preference for school test scores. 
The coefficients on the interactions of income and baseline score with school 
scores demonstrate that preferences for school test scores vary considerably with 
observable characteristics. Parameter estimates for the standard deviation in idiosyncratic 
preferences for academics are reported in Row 2. While differences in baseline test scores 
and income each generate a standard deviation in preferences of roughly 0.3-0.6 based on 
the calculations from the previous paragraph, the estimated standard deviation in 
idiosyncratic preferences for school test scores is also around 0.3 for non-whites and 0.65 
for whites. Hence, there is substantial unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for test 
                                                 
17 For students who are eligible for lunch subsidies, we did not include the interaction with neighborhood 
income because all of these students are presumably very low income. In initial specifications using a 
conditional logit, income interactions with the preference for school scores were generally insignificant for 
the lunch-recipient segments. 
18 Recall that both neighborhood income and the student’s baseline score are “de-meaned”, so that the 
coefficient on the main effect of school score measures the value of school test score for a student with 
average income and baseline test score (both equal to zero).   19
scores. The substantial variation across students in the weight placed on academics 
suggests that we may expect to see strong school choice selection on academic outcomes 
for some students and not for others. The fact that much of the heterogeneity in 
preferences is unobservable implies that the traditional approach of allowing the 
treatment effect to vary with observable characteristics, such as race or lunch status, may 
not completely capture heterogeneous treatment effects by preferences for academics.  
The parameter estimates for the remaining coefficients indicate that parents face 
important trade-offs between academic and non-academic factors when choosing schools. 
Rows 5 and 6 report the parameter estimates for the lognormal distribution of preferences 
for distance. Rows 7 and 8 report the mean preference and standard deviation for the 
neighborhood (or ‘home’) school.
19 Parents dislike distance and prefer their 
neighborhood school. These coefficients indicate that the average parent must trade-off 
utility for proximity in order to gain utility from expected academic outcomes. For most 
students, attending a high-achieving school will require them to choose a school that is 
farther than their home school and a school that is not their home school. Hence there is a 
negative correlation between school characteristics that measure proximity and those that 
capture academic achievement. This implies that parents of all races must, on average, 
trade-off utility for academic gains against utility gains for proximity. 
In addition to trading-off proximity for academics, African American parents 
must trade-off academic gains against the racial composition of peers. The preference 
coefficients on percent black imply that the average African American parent prefers 
schools where approximately 70% of the student body population is black (the peak of 
the mean quadratic preference for race), while the district as a whole is approximately 
45% African American. However, the percent black at a school is negatively correlated 
with average test scores (correlation is around -0.65). The negative correlation between 
test scores and racial composition implies that African American parents must value 
academic achievement much more than their white counterparts in order to induce them 
to choose a higher performing school that also has, on average, fewer African American 
                                                 
19 Hastings et al. (2006a) discuss the interpretation of the neighborhood school. They test if this coefficient 
represents a non-linearity in the preference for proximity or if it is potentially consistent with a default 
effect. They provide evidence that the preference for the neighborhood school is a neighborhood preference 
that is not generated by default behavior.    20
students. Given the coefficients for the quadratic term in racial preferences, the loss in 
utility for black families is highest when percent black is low (less than 40%), which is 
precisely the range in which school average test scores are highest. 
Based on the estimates in Table III, we used (8) to calculate a posterior estimate 
of the weight that each parent placed on academics when choosing schools for their child. 
Table IV reports the means and standard deviations for these posterior weights by the 
four demographic subgroups used in TableIII. There is considerable variation in these 
posterior weights in our sample, with a standard deviation that is more than one half of 
the sample mean (0.845 versus 1.348). The mean posterior weights vary across 
demographic subgroups as expected: however, there is also considerable variation in the 
posterior weights within each subgroup. This implies that parents’ reasons for choosing a 
school can differ substantially across race and lunch subsidy status; two prominent 
baseline characteristics focused on in the prior literature. 
 
V.  Estimating the Impact of Attending a 1
st Choice School on Academic 
Achievement 
 
  In this section we estimate the effect of attending a 1
st choice school on academic 
achievement, and examine how it varies across subgroups and with the estimated weight 
parents placed on test scores when choosing a school. We focus on the subset of students 
choosing schools that were over-subscribed and limit our sample to the marginal priority 
groups within those schools for whom lottery number alone determined initial admission. 
We ignore members of priority groups in which all students were either admitted or 
denied admission—since the assignment of lottery numbers had no impact on their 
admission status. This allows us to use the random admission of students into a school, 
conditional on the school they chose.
20  
We began with the choice forms submitted by 105,706 students in the first year.
21 
After dropping students who were not in grades 4-8, who had special disabilities needs, 
                                                 
20 In some schools, the marginal priority group will consist of those who attended the school the year 
before, or free-lunch eligible students, or students from the choice zone. The marginal priority group may 
also be different for different grade levels in a school. 
21 Reflecting the district’s intensive outreach efforts, choice forms were received for over 95% of all the 
students enrolling that fall.   21
and students who were admitted because of siblings, we were left with a sample of 
37,115. Of these, 22,872 listed their guaranteed home school (n=19,669) or magnet 
continuation school (n=3,203) and, therefore, were not subject to randomization. Another 
7,583 students were in groups sufficiently high on the priority list that they were not 
subject to the randomization. There were 3,065 students in marginal priority groups, 
described above as those priority groups within the schools where slots were allocated on 
the basis of a random number. Finally, there were 3,595 students in priority groups that 
were sufficiently low on the priority list that all members of the priority group were 
denied admission and placed on the waitlist.  
Table V compares descriptive statistics on the baseline characteristics of students 
in the marginal priority group to other students in the district. Overall, students in the 
marginal priority group appear to be fairly representative of students who chose a non-
guaranteed school. The only notable differences are that the marginal priority group was 
more likely to be eligible for lunch subsidies than the waitlisted group (reflecting the 
priority given to eligible students), and applied to schools with higher test scores than did 
the admitted group (reflecting capacity constraints at schools with higher test scores). Not 
surprisingly, students choosing non-guaranteed schools differed from students who chose 
a guaranteed school: they had home schools with lower test scores and higher proportions 
of minority and lunch-eligible students, and were more likely to minority, poor, and 
doing poorly in school themselves. Thus, the marginal priority group should provide a 
reasonable estimate of the impact of attending one’s first choice school for a typical 
student who chose a non-guaranteed school (i.e., treatment on the treated). In addition, 
the final row in Table V shows the mean weight placed on academics ( ˆ A
i β ) for students 
in the marginal priority group versus other students in the district. The mean  ˆ A
i β  for 
students in the randomized group is very similar to that for students in the district as a 
whole.
22  
Within the marginal priority groups, we want to estimate the impact of attending a 
first-choice school on academic outcomes using:  
                                                 
22 The low mean weight for students in the admitted group is consistent with the fact that these students 
were typically choosing lower-scoring and capacity unconstrained schools, as can be seen from the 
differences in sample means for the Average Combined Scores of the chosen school (row 8 in Table V).   22
(9)  ij j ij i ij stChoice Attended X Y ε δ γ α + + + = 1 1  
where Xi includes student baseline characteristics and δj are school lottery fixed-effects. 
Our controls include: gender, race/ethnicity, free lunch status, home school dummy 
variables, baseline test scores, income, absences, suspensions, and grade retentions. The 
fixed effects, δj, are included for each school and grade, to account for the fact that the 
probabilities of winning the lottery varied across lotteries (Rouse 1998). Our outcomes of 
interest, Yij, include absences, suspensions, and standardized test scores. In addition the 
testing data in North Carolina also includes student self-reports on the number of hours of 
home work they did each week, and we include this as an outcome as well. Since not all 
of those who won the lotteries actually chose to attend their first choice school, and some 
of those who lost the lotteries were subsequently admitted off the waiting lists, we used 
the randomized lottery outcome as an instrument for attending a first choice school. 
Random assignment by lottery implies that the impact of winning the lottery, γ1, is 
consistently estimated even without these control variables, but the additional control 
variables greatly improve precision. We report robust standard errors, allowing for 
correlations in outcomes among students with the same first-choice school (which may 
include more than one grade with a lottery). 
  To verify that winning the school lottery was truly random within the marginal 
priority group, we examine whether the baseline characteristics of lottery winners and 
losers differ in our estimation sample. Our estimation sample excludes 181 students who 
were in marginal priority groups but missing needed baseline characteristics such as 
address (which was used in the choice model). Table VI reports mean baseline 
characteristics for lottery winners and losers, as well as adjusted differences from an OLS 
regression that included fixed effects for the school program and grade for which the 
lottery was conducted. All of the differences in baseline characteristics were small and 
not significantly different from zero, verifying that lottery assignment was independent of 
student characteristics in our sample. 
Table VII shows reduced form estimates of the impact of winning the lottery on 
attrition and the characteristics of the school attended. These reduced form regressions 
used a specification identical to (9), but replacing the indicator for attending a first choice 
school with an indicator for winning the lottery. The first row shows that lottery winners   23
were 53 percentage points more likely to attend their first choice school than the lottery 
losers.
 23 The second row gives the effect of winning the lottery on whether or not the 
student was enrolled in any CMS school in the 2002-2003 school year. This estimate 
shows that there was no differential attrition across lottery winners and lottery losers.
24 
The remaining rows show that students who won the lottery attended schools with 
approximately one-tenth of a student-level standard deviation higher test scores, and 
seven percent fewer students who were eligible for lunch subsidies.  
Table VIII presents the results from the instrumental variables regression in (9) on 
measures of academic outcomes. Among these outcome measures, the average treatment 
effect is significant and negative for retention rates. Winning the lottery to attend a first 
choice school led to a reduction in retentions – a 2.3 percentage point decrease of an 
average base of 2.2%. However, we do not find a significant impact on absences or 
suspensions. In addition, we find that students who are randomized into their first choice 
school report spending more time on homework. The outcome measure is an indicator if 
the student reports spending more than 3 hours per week on homework on self-reported 
surveys given to students with the End of Grade exams. Even though students who attend 
their first choice school report a significant increase in homework hours, we find no 
measurable average effect on standardized test scores. The final row of estimates in Table 
VIII shows no significant impact of attending a first choice school on standardized test 
scores.
25 The point estimate is nearly zero, but there is a relatively large standard error.  
 
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Test Score Outcomes 
Table IX shows estimates of the average treatment effect on student test scores in 
various subgroups of students defined on the basis of student demographics or 
                                                 
23 This is the first stage regression for the instrumental variables regression of the impact on test scores of 
attending a first choice school. This estimate is not equal to 100 percent for two reasons: first, some of 
those who were given the opportunity to attend their first choice did not do so and, second, some of those 
who were originally waitlisted at their first choice were subsequently called off the waitlist. Overall, 
approximately 75% of lottery winners and 25% of lottery losers attended their first choice school.   
24 Average attrition rates were fairly low at 9.8%, and consistent with estimates of inter-county mobility 
rates from the Census. The estimated effect of winning the lottery on attrition is small in size (-0.018) and 
not significantly different than zero, indicating that there was no significant differential attrition by the end 
of the 2002-2003 school year.    
25 Regression estimates show the same effect on math and reading scores when run separately, so we use 
the combined score to improve precision.   24
characteristics of the school chosen. Prior studies have used these subgroups of students 
who on a priori grounds may have different underlying reasons for choosing schools that 
may be correlated with the expected treatment effect. Estimates for most of the subgroups 
remain insignificant. However, the estimated treatment effect is positive and significant 
for two of the subgroups (whites, and students with above median income) and there is an 
apparent pattern of positive treatment effects for higher SES students and students 
applying to higher-scoring schools.  
The pattern of subgroup impacts is strongly related to the average weight ( ˆ A
i β ) 
that parents place on school test scores. Columns 3 and 4 of Table IX report the mean 
ˆ A
i β and its standard deviation, respectively, for students in each of the subgroups. There is 
a positive correlation between  ˆ A
i β  and the estimated subgroup impacts across each of the 
subgroups. Figure 2 plots the subgroup estimates from Table IX against the mean  ˆ A
i β  for 
each subgroup. The strong positive correlation between the two (correlation=0.89) 
suggests that differences in impacts across subgroups may be generated by differences in 
the underlying determinants of choice, but the large variation in  ˆ A
i β  within each 
subgroup reported in Table IX, suggests that subgroup impacts may be insignificant if 
differences in the weights parents place on academics are driving heterogeneous 
treatment effects. 
This evidence highlights three advantages of using estimates of  ˆ A
i β  to identify 
heterogeneous treatment effects over subgroup estimation based on observables such as 
race and income. First, using a single index, rather than estimating differences in impacts 
for an arbitrary number of subgroups, increases the precision with which we can identify 
heterogeneous treatment effects by exploiting all of the within and between subgroup 
variation in preferences. Second, the  ˆ A
i β  incorporate information on the choice set, 
distinguishing between students who pick a good school because it is convenient versus 
students who pick it for its academics. Third, the ˆ A
i β  give us an economic interpretation 
for subgroup impacts, allowing us to evaluate the impact of school choice outside of the 
estimation sample, and to potentially design school choice plans that address differences   25
in the underlying drivers of parental choice (Hastings et al. (2007), Hastings and 
Weinstein (2007)).  
We therefore allow the impact of attending a first choice school on standardized 
test scores to vary explicitly with  ˆ A
i β  by estimating:  
(10)  ij j
A
i ij ij i ij stChoice Attended stChoice Attended X Y ε δ β γ γ α + + ∗ + + = ˆ 1 1 2 1  
We estimate (10) by instrumental variables, using winning the lottery and winning the 
lottery interacted with  ˆ A
i β  as instruments, and adding  ˆ A
i β  as a control variable. Note that 
all of the information used to derive the preference weights was observed prior to 
randomization. Since  ˆ A
i β  depends only on baseline data that is independent of whether 
the student won the lottery, its interaction with winning the lottery is a valid instrument 
once one has conditioned on baseline data. Finally, note that coefficient estimates for 
terms involving  ˆ A





i β β ˆ − ) is uncorrelated with the posterior estimate  ˆ A
i β  by 
construction (Hyslop and Imbens (2001)). The results from (10) are presented in Table X. 
The coefficients imply that the effect of attending one’s first choice school on a 
student’s test scores is significantly increasing with the weight that a student placed on 
test scores in choosing a school. The regression estimates imply that a one standard 
deviation increase in the weight that an individual places on school test scores raises the 
treatment effect on the student’s own test score by 0.062 standard deviations. For 
students who place no weight on test scores in their school choice, the coefficient on 
attending one’s first-choice school implies a negative (although not significant) treatment 
effect – their test scores fall by 0.105 standard deviations if they attend their first-choice 
school. These estimates imply a small negative impact (-0.002 standard deviation score 
gain) of attending a first-choice school on test scores for an average student with a  ˆ A
i β  of 
1.34, and a large positive effect on test scores (about 0.10) for students at the 95
th 
percentile of the  ˆ A
i β  distribution.  
A 0.1 standard deviation increase in a student’s test score results is equivalent to a 
3-4 percentile rank gain in test scores. Child development psychologists suggest that a 5 
percentile rank gain in a student’s test score translates into a significant cognitive gain in   26
academic aptitude. Alternatively, estimates of the impact that test scores have on future 
earnings suggest that a 0.1 standard deviation in increase in test scores is worth $10,000 
to $20,000 in net present value of future earnings (Kane and Staiger (2002)). 
 
Parents Who Face Significant Tradeoffs 
These estimates are consistent with our general prediction that students with high  ˆ A
i β  
should have a positive expected treatment effect (gain in academic achievement from 
attending the first-choice school). However, the treatment effect for a student with 
low ˆ A
i β  (near zero) is theoretically ambiguous and depends on whether parents face trade-
offs – if expected academic achievement is negatively correlated with other valued school 
characteristics. Since the percent black at a school is negatively correlated with average 
test scores in CMS schools (correlation is around -0.65), the racial composition of a 
school is an important trade-off that many African American parents face. We estimate 
(from the mixed logit results) that the average African American parent prefers schools 
where approximately 70% of the student population is black. Parents that prefer a school 
with a high proportion of African American students must value academic achievement 
more in order to induce them to choose a higher performing school that also has, on 
average, fewer African American students. Thus, all students with strong academic 
preferences (high- ˆ A
i β ) will have a positive gain in academic achievement from attending 
the first choice school, but among students with weak academic preferences (low- ˆ A
i β ) we 
might expect a negative treatment effect among students that prefer a school with a high 
proportion African American. In other words, the interaction effect between  ˆ A
i β  and 
winning the school choice lottery should have a negative intercept and a steeper slope for 
students who have strong preferences for predominantly African American schools.  
Table XI presents the results from specifications identical to those in Table X, but 
estimated separately for students who prefer a school that is less than 55 percent black 
(primarily white students) and students of parents who prefer a school that is more than 
55 percent black (primarily non-white students). Posterior estimates of student-level 
preferences for school racial composition were calculated in the same way as the  ˆ A
i β ’s   27
were. The average treatment effect is positive for students who prefer a predominantly 
white school, and there is no significant interaction with the weight that the student 
places on test scores in their school choice. Among students of parents who prefer 
predominantly white schools, both relatively high- and low- ˆ A
i β  students experience 
academic gains from attending their first choice school. In contrast, for students of 
parents who prefer a predominantly black school there is a significant interaction between 
their estimated preference for academics and the treatment effect. High- ˆ A
i β  students 
experience academic gains from attending their first choice school that are similar to 
students who prefer a predominantly white school. In contrast, low- ˆ A
i β  students who 
prefer a predominantly black school experience a negative effect on academic 
performance from attending their first choice school. This evidence suggests that the 
relationship between preferences and treatment effects may depend importantly on the 
trade-offs that parents face given their preferences and their school choice options. These 
results also highlight the potential importance of the underlying decision-making process 
to understanding the heterogeneous impacts that public school choice has on student 
academic outcomes.  
 
Schools versus Student-school Interactions 
  Our results show that the school one attends has a causal impact on student 
academic outcomes, but not all parents choose a school that maximizes their child’s 
academic gains. Students of parents who choose schools primarily based on academic 
characteristics are able to get those gains from attending their chosen schools. An 
interesting secondary question is whether all students (even those students whose parents 
put little weight on academics) would gain academically from attending these same 
schools. Do students of parents who place a high weight on academics simply choose 
better schools in the sense that any student attending such a school would receive a 
positive treatment effect? If so, efforts to identify these schools and steer students 
towards them may increase the impact of school choice on academic outcomes. 
Alternatively, academic gains may be student-school specific, with the impact of 
attending a school depending on the student’s ability to gain academically at that school.   28
In this case, students whose parents choose for academic achievement at a particular 
school will have gains in academics that students whose parents chose the same school 
for convenience will not.  
  In Table XII, we investigate the extent to which the heterogeneity in treatment 
effects associated with individual preferences for academics can be explained by 
characteristics of the school chosen (suggesting common school quality). The first 
column of the table replicates the base estimates for comparison. The next two columns 
add an interaction to allow the treatment effect to depend on the difference in average test 
scores between the 1
st-choice school and the home school. This interaction is 
insignificant on its own, and has no impact on the interaction with  ˆ A
i β , suggesting that 
the gap in test scores in not a good indicator of the likely treatment effect. Columns 4 and 
5 add an interaction with the average test score in the 1
st-choice school (not relative to the 
home school), and the results are similar. Since average test scores may be a poor proxy 
for academic quality of a school, the remaining columns of the table try interacting the 
treatment with the average weight ( ˆ A
i β ) among all students participating in the school’s 
lottery (a high average indicates the school attracts students who care about academics) 
and a full set of school effects (allowing each school to have its own average impact on 
student outcomes). In both of these specifications, we find no significant evidence of 
heterogeneity in treatment effects across schools, and the coefficient on the interaction 
with  ˆ A
i β  is little changed (although the standard errors are larger). 
  Overall, the heterogeneity in treatment effects associated with individual 
preferences for academics do not appear to be explained by characteristics of the school 
chosen, although the estimates are not very precise. The general pattern of results 
suggests that student and school interactions play a more important role in determining 
academic outcomes.  
 
VI.   Conclusion 
 
  When given the choice to attend a public school other than the home school to 
which they have been assigned, the parents of 49 percent of the students in Charlotte took   29
the opportunity and listed a school other than their assigned school as a first choice.  In 
this paper, we evaluate the impact of switching schools on various academic and non-
academic outcomes. On average, among those applying to the oversubscribed schools, 
winning the lottery had no discernable impact on students’ own reading and math scores 
overall, even though lottery winners attended schools with higher math and reading 
scores than did lottery losers. Winning the lottery had only modest impacts on other 
outcomes, such as increasing homework time and reducing grade retentions.  
However, parents seem to choose schools for many different reasons.  Indeed, one 
quarter of parents were willing to switch chose schools with lower mean test scores than 
their assigned schools. Overall, the results presented in this paper imply that the impact of 
attending one’s first choice school on academic outcomes is significantly increasing with 
the value that students parents placed on test scores when choosing a school. Students of 
parents who placed a high weight on school test scores experienced gains in tests scores 
as a result of attending the first-choice school. In contrast, students of parents who placed 
a low weight on school test scores experienced (insignificant) declines in test scores as a 
result of attending their first-choice school.  
A number of recent papers have found no impact on average of attending a first-
choice school on academic achievement. Our evidence suggests that the absence of any 
academic gains on average does not imply that school choice is ineffective. On the 
contrary, parents appear to get what they want. When parents want improved academic 
outcomes, they are able to get them. When parents value other school attributes, and are 
willing to trade off academic gains for utility gains on other dimensions, school choice 
will allow them to make that choice—even if maximizing parental utility does not 
maximize academic achievement. In general the marginal impact of school choice on 
academic outcomes will depend on both the willingness of parents to make these 
tradeoffs, and the extent to which the available school choices require such tradeoffs to 
be made.    30
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Figure 2.  Subgroup Estimates of the Effect of Attending a 1
st-choice School  
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Table I: Key Explanatory Variable Definitions  
Variable   Description 
 
Distance  Driving distance from student i to school j calculated  
  using MapInfo with Census Tiger Line files. 
 
School Score  Average of the student-level standardized scale score for  
 
students in school j on math and reading End of Grade exams for 
the 2002-2003 school year. This is the average of the test score 
variable described below across all students in school j.  
 
Test Score  The sum of student i's scale score on End of Grade math and  
  reading exams in baseline year 2001-2002 standardized by the 
 
mean and standard deviation of district-wide scores for students 
in his or her grade. 
 
Income  The median household income reported in the 2000 Census  
  for households of student i's race in student i's block group.  
  Income is demeaned by the county-wide average of  
  approximately $51,000 and is reported in thousands of dollars. 
 
Percent Black  The percent of students in school j who are black according  





Table II: Key Explanatory Variable Summary Statistics 
Summary Statistics Using First Choice Data    
Variable  Obs.   Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Distance  2434113 13.0071 6.7254 0.0010 42.4069 
School Score  2434113 -0.1087 0.4487 -0.9537 1.9478 
Test score  2434113 0.0567 0.9886 -2.9113 3.0255 
Income  2434113 5.1226 27.5669 -48.5010 149.0010 
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Variable Parameter  White  Black  White  Black 
Preferences for Scores     
     School Score  Mean  1.1732 1.8035 0.3671 0.9396
 Std.  Dev.  0.5674 0.2688 0.6175 0.2706
Income*School Score  Mean  0.0151 0.0126 -- -- 
 Std.  Dev.  -- -- -- -- 
Baseline own score * 
School Score  Mean  0.5558 0.5734 0.2924 0.4995
 Std.  Dev.  -- -- -- -- 
Preferences for Proximity    
Distance** Mean    -0.3526 -0.2684 -0.3784 -0.2751
  Std. Dev.   0.0684 0.0413 0.1273 0.0639
Home School  Mean  2.1300 1.7373 1.9816 1.7710
 Std.  Dev.  0.5130 0.6799 0.8248 0.7752
Preferences for Race     
Percent Black   Mean  3.3068 5.1340 1.9268 3.1409
 Std.  Dev.  2.6417 1.6447 2.0795 0.8745
Percent Black Sqaured  Mean  -5.4580 -3.6790 -3.5385 -2.3005
 Std.  Dev.  -- -- -- -- 
    
Implied Mean 
Preferred % Black  0.3029 0.6977 0.2723 0.6827
 Std.  Dev.  0.2420 0.2235 0.2938 0.1901
Other Preferences     
Last-year School  Mean  3.7941 3.3837 3.5016 2.8495
 Std.  Dev.  2.4977 2.7896 3.4651 3.3825
Choice Zone (busing)  Mean  1.1909 1.2484 1.9203 1.6132
 Std.  Dev.  0.8285 1.2418 1.5083 1.2442
    
   
Estimated Correlation Coefficients:   
Corr(Distance, School Score)  0.4939 -0.1055 0.3379 -0.6355
Corr(Distance, Home School)  -0.0788 0.0007 -0.2623 -0.1122
Corr(School Score, Home School)  -0.7888 -0.6016 -0.8411 -0.5895
    
* All estimates are significant at the 1% level or higher   





   37
Table IV: Summary Statistics of Posterior Weight Placed On Academics when Choosing a School 
  




  All  Students  White Black White Black 
        
Mean  1.348  1.872 1.746 0.343 0.632 
Standard Deviation  0.845  0.676 0.598 0.381 0.448 
10
th Percentile  0.256 1.005  0.994  -0.121  0.052 
Median  1.320  1.882 1.729 0.320 0.621 
90
th Percentile  2.461  2.700 2.515 0.838 1.221 
 
Table V:  Comparison of Student Characteristics  






School  Admitted   Randomized  Waitlisted 
Student demographics        
Black 44.3%  34.6%  62.5%  59.7%  54.8% 
Free or reduced lunch  39.2%  31.3%  60.3%  51.3%  34.3% 
Student's prior year performance       
Reading test score (SD units)  0.02  0.15  -0.26  -0.09  -0.11 
Math test score (SD units)  0.02  0.16  -0.26  -0.12  -0.15 
Absent 18 or more days  8.5%  6.8%  11.7%  10.8%  10.7% 
Retained 1.5%  1.2%  2.0%  1.9%  1.9% 
Suspended 12.2%  9.3%  17.7%  16.5%  15.4% 
Choice school characteristics        
Average combined scores  0.05  0.09  -0.09  0.08  0.10 
    Percent free or reduced lunch  40.6%  38.6%  50.9%  36.6%  35.6% 
Percent black or hispanic  49.4%  46.2%  59.8%  50.0%  47.0% 
Home school characteristics        
Average combined scores  -0.08  0.03  -0.28  -0.23  -0.27 
    Percent free or reduced lunch  47.0%  40.7%  59.3%  53.3%  56.0% 
Percent black or hispanic  53.6%  47.1%  65.3%  61.6%  63.8% 
School assignment        
Assigned to 1st choice  85.4%  100.0%  100.0%  40.4%  0.0% 
Assigned to guaranteed school  72.5%  100.0%  0.0%  44.6%  74.5% 
School attendance 02-03        
Attended 1st choice  78.7%  92.1%  81.6%  45.4%  16.2% 
Attended home school  58.8%  79.4%  9.7%  35.0%  51.3% 
Posterior Weights        
Weight Placed on Academics -  ˆ A
i β   1.36 1.44  1.09 1.33 1.39 
        
Number of students  37115 22872 7583  3065  3595 
Notes: Data from Charlotte-Mecklenberg Schools (CMS).  Sample includes all students in grades 4-8 who applied to a regular or 
magnet school as their 1
st choice for the 2002-2003 school year and were enrolled in CMS in the 2001-2002 school year. Students 
guaranteed placement because of siblings or in ESL are excluded.   38
 
Table VI: Baseline Characteristics by Treatment and Control Group 
Variable Admitted  Waitlisted  Difference 
Adjusted 
Difference
Student demographics      
Black  0.614 0.585 0.030 0.011 
       (0.067)  (0.022) 
      
Free or reduced lunch  0.467  0.531  -0.064  -0.015 
       (0.078)  (0.012) 
      
Median income ($1000s) by race   48.4  49.4  -1.0  -0.7 
and block-group in 2000 census      (3.6)  (0.7) 
      
Student's prior year performance      
Reading test score   -0.127  -0.069  -0.058  -0.025 
       (0.110)  (0.031) 
      
Math test score   -0.135  -0.113  0.023  0.025 
       (0.106)  (0.030) 
      
Absent 18 or more days  0.097  0.106  -0.009  -0.007 
       (0.013)  (0.016) 
      
Suspended 0.152  0.162  -0.010  -0.022 
       (0.028)  (0.015) 
      
Retained  0.019 0.018 0.001 0.001 
       (0.005)  (0.006) 
Home school characteristics      
Average combined score  -0.241  -0.213  -0.028  0.003 
       (0.051)  (0.013) 
      
Percent free or reduced lunch  0.543  0.524  0.019  0.001 
       (0.034)  (0.007) 
      
Percent  black  0.625 0.607 0.018 -0.003 
       (0.036)  (0.007) 
      
Number of students  1175  1709  2884  2884 
Notes: Sample limited to students in randomized priority groups with complete baseline data.  Difference is 
between students admitted (won the lottery) and waitlisted (did not win the lottery).  Each adjusted difference 
is from a separate regression of the given baseline characteristic on whether the student was randomly 
assigned to her first-choice school, controlling for lottery fixed effects.  Standard errors adjust for clustering at 
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Table VII: The Impact of Being Randomly Assigned to 1st Choice School on 
Characteristics of School Attending at End of 2002-2003 School Year 
Characteristic of School Attending   Mean Estimated  Impact 
    
First choice school  0.460       0.533*** 
     (0.054) 
    
Not attending CMS in 2002-2003 (Attrition)  0.098  -0.018 
   (0.011) 
    
School average combined score  -0.073        0.129** 
      (0.040) 
    
Percent free or reduced lunch  0.463  -0.070*** 
   (0.019) 
    
Percent black or Hispanic  0.576  -0.049 
   (0.026) 
    
Number of Students    2884 
Note: Each entry in the table is from a separate regression of the given characteristic of the school a student was 
attending at the end of the year on whether the student was randomly assigned to her first choice school, 
controlling for lottery fixed effects, home school fixed effects, and the baseline covariates listed in Table V.  
Sample includes only students in the randomized priority group with complete baseline data.  Standard errors 
adjust for clustering at the level of the first choice school. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.05, **=.01, 
***=.001). 
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Table VIII.  Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Impact of Attending 1
st 
Choice School on Student Outcomes in 2002-2003 
Student Outcome  Mean 
Average  
Treatment Effect 
Non-academic Measures    
Absent 18 or more days  0.135  -0.001 
      (0.023) 
    
Suspended 0.201  0.012 
      (0.032) 
    
Retained 0.022  -0.023* 
      (0.009) 
    
> 3 hrs. homework per week  0.303  0.122* 
     (0.050) 
Academic Performance    
Combined test score  -0.086 -0.005 
     (0.050) 
    
Note: Each entry in the table is from a separate IV regression of the given student outcome on whether the 
student was attending her first choice school, using random assignment to the first choice school as an 
instrument.  These regressions control for lottery fixed effects, home school fixed effects, and the baseline 
covariates listed in table V.  Sample includes 2884 students in the randomized priority group with 
complete baseline data. Sample sizes for homework (N=2554) and combined test score (N=2581) are 
smaller due to missing data on the dependent variable for some students.  Standard errors adjust for 
clustering at the level of the first choice school. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.05, **=.01, ***=.001). 
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Table IX: Subgroup Estimates of the Effect of Attending a 1




IV Estimate of 
Effect of Attending 
1
st-Choice School on 
Combined Test 
Score  Mean  ˆ A




of  ˆ A





        
All Students  -0.005  1.34  0.81  2581 
 (0.050)       
Race:        
 Non-White  -0.067  1.12  0.71  1790 
 (0.058)       
 White  0.172*  1.85  0.77  791 
 (0.073)       
Income:        
 Below  Median  -0.100  1.01  0.61  1601 
 (0.058)      
 Above  Median  0.130*  1.90  0.78  980 
 (0.063)       
Free Lunch Eligibility        
 Eligible  -0.061  0.74  0.44  1296 
 (0.078)      
 Not  Eligible  0.070  1.95  0.62  1285 
 (0.043)       
Baseline Test Score        
 Below  Average  -0.040  0.83  0.52  1386 
 (0.055)      
 Above  Average  0.066  1.94  0.65  1195 
 (0.064)       
1
st-Choice School Combined Score        
 Below  Median  -0.036  1.07  0.69  1337 
 (0.080)      
 Above  Median  0.047  1.64  0.82  1244 
 (0.043)       
Note: Each row of column 2 reports estimates for a different student sub-sample, as indicated. Column 2 reports IV estimates of 
the impact of attending the first choice school on the combined student test score, using random assignment to the first choice 
school as an instrument.  Regressions control for lottery fixed effects, home school fixed effects, and the baseline covariates 
listed in table V.  Sample includes only students in the randomized priority group with complete baseline data.  Standard errors 
adjust for clustering at the level of the first choice school. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.05, **=.01, ***=.001). Column 3 
reports the average weight that parents place on test scores (Weight) in their school choice decision calculated according to 
equation (8).  The second column reports the standard deviation of Weight among families in each of the subgroup categories.   42
 
Table X:  IV Estimates of the Impact of Attending 1st Choice School with 
Heterogeneous Treatment by Weight Placed on Academics in Choice Decision 
Dependent Variable:  
          Combined Score (1)  (2) 
    
Attended 1st-choice school  -0.005  -0.105 
 (0.050)  (0.074) 
    
Weight * attended 1st-choice school   0.077* 
   (0.031) 
    
P-value for interaction with Weight   0.016 
    
Joint p-value on reported coefficients  0.924  0.031 
    
Observations 2581  2581 
    
Notes: Each column in the table is from a separate IV regression.  The dependent variable is a student's 
combined standardized test score in the spring of 2003.  Each specification reports the coefficients on attending 
the first choice school and its interaction with the weight that the student places on test scores (Weight) in the 
school choice decision, using random assignment to the first-choice school and its interaction with Weight as 
instruments.  All specifications control for lottery fixed effects, home school fixed effects, the baseline 
covariates listed in Table V, and a direct control for the student's Weight estimate.  Sample includes only 
students in the randomized priority group with complete baseline data. Standard errors adjust for clustering at 
the level of the first choice school. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.05, **=.01, ***=.001). 
 
   43
 
Table XI:  IV Estimates of the Impact of Attending 1st Choice School with 
Heterogeneous Treatment by Weight Placed on Academics in Choice Decision, 
Estimated Separately by Student Preference for Racial Mix at School 
Dependent Variable:  
          Combined Score 
Students Who Prefer 
School Less Than 
55% Black 
Students Who Prefer 
School at Least  
55% Black 
      
Attended 1st-choice school  0.115  0.186  -0.054  -0.164* 
  (0.058) (0.158) (0.059) (0.078) 
      
Weight * attended 1st-choice school   -0.041  0.098* 
   (0.065)  (0.041) 
      
P-value for interaction with Weight   0.533    0.019 
      
Joint p-value on reported coefficients  0.052  0.097  0.250  0.053 
      
Observations 870  870  1711  1711 
      
Notes: Each column in the table is from a separate IV regression.  The dependent variable is a student's 
combined standardized test score in the spring of 2003.  Each specification reports the coefficients on attending 
the first choice school and it interaction with the weight that the student places on test scores (Weight) in the 
school choice decision, using random assignment to the first-choice school and its interaction with Weight as 
instruments.  All specifications control for lottery fixed effects, home school fixed effects, the baseline 
covariates listed in Table V, and a direct control for the student's Weight estimate.  Sample includes only 
students in the randomized priority group with complete baseline data.  Student preference for racial 
composition in the school is each student’s posterior estimate of the value that maximizes their quadratic utility 
in %black at the school.  Standard errors adjust for clustering at the level of the first choice school. Asterisks 
indicate significance (*=.05, **=.01, ***=.001). 
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Table XII. IV Estimates of the Impact of Attending 1st Choice School with Heterogeneous Treatment Effect Associated With 





















           
Attended 1st-choice school  -0.105  0.000  -0.100  -0.015  -0.089  -0.164  -0.166  n.a. n.a. 
 (0.074)  (0.057)  (0.077)  (0.049)  (0.073)  (0.132)  (0.132)    
           
Attended  1st-choice  school  *           
           
 Weight  0.077*  0.077*    0.061    0.043    0.074 
 (0.031)    (0.032)    (0.041)    (0.053)    (0.071) 
           
  Difference in average school scores    -0.017  -0.019        
   (0.072)  (0.077)        
            
  Average score in 1
st-choice school        0.136  0.082      
       (0.090)  (0.114)      
            
 Average  Weight of students in lottery            0.121  0.081    
         (0.075)  (0.112)    
            
P-value for interaction with Weight  0.016    0.018    0.149    0.427    0.293 
            
P-value for other interaction(s)    0.813  0.803  0.136  0.474  0.109  0.472  0.066  0.203 
           
Joint p-value on reported coefficients  0.031  0.963  0.071  0.241  0.02  0.13  0.039  0.069  0.177 
           
Observations  2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2581 2475 2475 
           
Notes: Each column in the table is from a separate IV regression.  The dependent variable is a student's combined standardized test score in the spring of 2003.  All specifications 
include the same controls as in Table X.  Standard errors adjust for clustering at the level of the first choice school. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.05, **=.01, ***=.001). 
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